Family labour supply when the husband is eligible for early retirement. by Erik Hernæs & Steinar Strøm
 25 April 2000 
 










When the husband works in the private sector in Norway the take-up rate of early retirement during the 
first twelve months after becoming eligible (once during 1993 and 1994) was around 40 percent. If the 
husband works in the public sector the corresponding take up rate was around 25 percent. A model with 
forward-looking and utility maximising married couples, where the husband only is eligible for early 
retirement, has been estimated on these data. The estimated model has been used to predict the labour 
supply  responses of the husband and wife when pensions are taxed as wage earnings.  
  Taxing early benefits as labour earnings induces a substantial decline in retirement and a 
substantial shift towards full-time work among males. Females tend to decrease their labour supply a 
little. An additional 10 per cent cut in the pre-tax pension income has a positive impact on full-time 
work among both spouses, but the effect is a magnitude smaller than the effect obtained by changing 
taxation.  
Husbands in poor households tend to increase their labour supply more than husbands in rich 
households. Poor households are also more negatively hit in terms of loss in expected household 
welfare than the rich households. 
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1. Introduction 
As in many other OECD countries, labour force participation of Norwegian males 
above the age of 60 has gone down over a number of years (Wadensjø, 1996). Part of 
this decline can be explained by the introduction of early retirement programs. Early 
retirement programs may thus have made male labour supply more elastic than it was 
some years earlier. In contrast to male participation the female labour force 
participation has increased over the last two decades by 15 percentage points, 
although it is still below the male level (Statistics Norway, 1996). This will increase 
the accrued pension rights of females of retirement age in the years to come.  
Because most men and women are married or cohabiting it could be important 
to account for the fact that observed behaviour in the labour market may be due to 
joint decisions by married couples. This will also be important when early retirement 
decisions are analysed. The purpose of our paper is to analyse this aspect of labour 
supply in the context of family labour supply. Because the early retirement age in 
Norway is the same across gender and because of the age difference between married 
men and women, only families where the husband is eligible for early retirement are 
included in our sample. 
The decision of the husband to retire early is modelled as the outcome of a 
joint labour supply decision made by the couple. As a consequence of this we will be 
able to simulate how the labour supply of both spouses may be affected by changes in 
the budget constraints, for example by a change in tax and pension rules. 
Empirical studies of retirement behaviour in a household context are rare. 
Most of the studies have focused on patterns of family retirement, like “wife first”, 
“joint retirement” and “husband first”, see Henretta and O’Rand (1983) for an early 
contribution. A more recent study is Zveimüller et al. (1996) who estimate a bivariate 
probit model on Austrian data. The probability for a married man and woman to retire 
is assumed to depend on Social Security characteristics of both spouses and on 
individual characteristics. The model allows for correlation of unobserved normally 
distributed variables across gender. A main finding in their study is that husbands 
react to changes in wives’ legal minimum retirement age but not vice versa. The 
model is static in the sense that only current incomes in the period studied affect the 
retirement decision. No earnings history is observed which implies that the pension 
income has to be estimated based on the observations of pension income among those 
who have retired and who also report the retirement benefits in the survey. Taxation is 
not accounted for. Dates of retirement are not observed so the focus is on husbands’ 
and wives’ retirement probabilities at a given point in time, rather than on the age of  3
withdrawing from the labour force. Eligibility, specified as a dummy, enters the set of 
covariates in the bivariate probit.    
Other recent studies are Gustman and Steinmaier (1994) who find that the 
wife’s retirement has a notable effect on the husband’s propensity to retire, but not 
vice versa, and Baker (1999) who finds that the propensity to retire among males is 
around 5-10  percentage points higher when the wife is eligible for a supplementary 
pension.  
  Blau (1997) estimates the impact of Social Security benefits on the labour 
force behaviour of older married couples in the U.S. He distinguishes between a 
spouse benefit and retired worker benefit. A spouse receives the larger of the two. If 
the spouse benefit is the largest, then this may create a work-disincentive for the one 
who receives, typically the wife. His main findings is that the spouse benefit has a 
negative, but small, impact on the labour supply of the wives, and a positive, but 
small, impact on the labour supply of the husbands.   
  Another vein of research is the option value approach of Stock and Wise 
(1990). The focus is on a pension plan in a large firm and the study is thus not directed 
to the effects of the Social Security benefits on retirement, as in the cases referred to 
above. These firm pension plans offered the employees a bonus if they worked until a 
certain age, otherwise the bonus was lost. The option value model of Stock and Wise 
(op. cit.) is a simplified and myopic, sub-optimal, version of a dynamic programming 
model, but considerably less complex to estimate. A problem with their analysis is the 
fact that one cannot ignore the possibility that workers, in their data set salesmen, who 
retire early from the considered firm may start to work for other firms. 
  Like Stock and Wise (op. cit.) we study the propensity to retire early by 
exploiting the observations generated by the introduction of a company-specific, early 
retirement program in 1989. In 1988 unions and employers negotiated an early 
retirement scheme, covering a substantial proportion of the employees. Eligibility has 
been extended in several steps since 1989. The scheme now covers the whole public 
sector (40 per cent of all employees in 1992) and private companies employing about 
43 per cent of all employees in the private sector with an age limit of 62. Self-
employed are not included. (NOU, 1994 and NOU, 1998). From January 1, 1989 the 
early retirement age was lowered from 67 to 66, from January 1,1990 to 65, from 
October 1, 1993 to 64, from October 1, 1997 to 63 and from March 1, 1998 to 62. In 
contrast to Stock and Wise (op. cit.) in our study retirement is an absorbing state. 
During the observation period analysed here (1992-1995), there was no option to 
combine work and early retirement. Furthermore, married couples are identified, 
which allows for an analysis of the joint decision of labour supply among married 
couples. As already mentioned our study is limited to the analysis of labour supply  4
among married couples where the husband only is eligible for early retirement. 
Because of the age difference between husband and wives, there are a negligible 
number of cases where both spouses became eligible for early retirement during our 
observation period.  
We have limited our study to labour market behaviour the first twelve months 
after the husband became eligible for early retirement. This eligibility could occur 
during 1993 and 1994 and these two years are our estimation period. We also observe 
the individuals during 1992, which we call history, and throughout 1995, which we 
call future. Note that the year starts when the husband becomes eligible and 
consequently the calendar date of the start of the observation year will vary across 
households with the age of the husband.  
 Because the choice to retire during the first twelve months after eligibility is 
assumed to exclude the possibility of going back to work in the future, we allow the 
individuals to take this irreversibility into account when they make their choices. 
Thus, here we differ from the previous studies referred to above, with the exception of 
Stock and Wise (op. cit.) Moreover in contrast to these other studies we observe  
-  the exact dates of retirement, 
-  the working history which implies that we can calculate the retirement benefits 
from pension rules, 
-  tax rules which differ considerably between earnings and retirement benefits. 
Furthermore, we estimate a structural model in the sense that preferences can be 
separated from the budget constraints and we may thus be able to use the estimated 
model to simulate the impact on retirement of changes in the budget sets. 
  The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and the 
choice of functional forms. In Section 3 we give estimates and predictions while in 
Section 4 we report the outcome of a policy simulation. In this simulation the tax rules 
operating on pension income is replaced by the less generous tax rules related to wage 
income. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. In the Appendix we describe the 
institutional setting, data sources, the sample and the variables used in the analysis, 







2. The model and functional forms 
The states 
Feasible states are given in the following table: 
 
 
Table 1. Feasible states 
States Male  Female 
1  Full-time work  Full-time work 
2  Part-time work  Part-time work 
3 Delayed  retirement   
4 Immediate  retirement   
5    Out of the labour force 
 
In most data sets hours of work are either observed in broad categories or the 
observations are contaminated with severe measurement errors. Moreover, jobs are 
typically offered with a fixed number of hours. Therefore we let hours of work be 
represented by two values only, full-time work equal to 46x37.5 hours a year (1725 
hours) and part-time work which is set to half of this annual load.  
Immediate retirement means that the male takes up retirement during the first 
two months after he became eligible, whereas delayed retirement means that he does 
so during the subsequent 10 months. 
In explaining the choices made by the couple we allow the utility maximising 
couple to take into account that if the male has chosen immediate or delayed 
retirement, only retirement is a feasible state next year. Thus, retirement is an 
absorbing state. Therefore, if in period t the male occupies states 1 or 2, then states 1,2 
and 4 are feasible for him also the next period (t+1). If the male is in state 3 or 4 in 
period t, only state 4 is feasible in period t+1.    
  The reasons why it could be of interest to leave options open for flexible 
choices in the next period are:  
-  retirement benefits may rise for government employee; pension is related to last 
year, 
-  income in the year preceding retirement may increase due to seniority rules, 
-  labour income may rise next year, 
-  tax and pension rules may change. 
    The labour attachment of the female the first year puts no limitation on her 
choice set the following year.  6
 
The Model 
Let Uij(t) be the instantaneous utility in period t when the husband occupies state i and 
the wife occupies state j. As analysts we are not able to observe preferences and thus 
from our point of view they are random. We will assume that the random 
instantaneous utility is given by 
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where uij(t) is the deterministic part of the utility function and εij(t) is the random part, 
which is assumed to be extreme value distributed (IID across states and households) 
with location parameter η, equal to 0.57777 (Eulers constant), and standard deviation 
σ. 
 Let  Wij be the decision function that the households employ when making 
their choices with respect to labour market attachments in period t, given that the 
choices in period t may restrict the possible choices in period t+1. We will assume that 
at the start of period the households know the random component of utility, but that 
the future component is not known. As common in stochastic dynamic choice models, 
we assume that the households know Uij and consider only the expected value in 
period t+1. Thus, Wij may be written  
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where  γ is the discount factor and where ks(ij) means the feasible alternatives in 
period t+1 when the household chooses (ij) in period t. 
  If the husband chooses states 1 or 2 in period t (no matter what the wife 
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then Y1(t+1) is extreme value distributed (Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)) with 
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Similarly, if the husband chooses state 3 or 4 in period t, the choice set available in 
period t+1 is  
S2={4,1),(4,2),(4,5)}. 
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The household decision function can thus be written as 
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Under the assumption of utility maximisation the probability that state (i,j) is chosen 
is given by 
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The choice probabilities can then be written: 
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From (9) and (10) we observe that if γ=0, then the choice probabilities become equal 
to probabilities in a static multinomial logit model, i.e. with the deterministic part of 
the utility function in the first period only appearing in the choice probabilities.  
From vij= σuij and (9) and (10) we observe that the scale parameters of the 
utility function, i.e. the parameters that enter uij in a linear way, cannot be recovered 
from data. The shape parameters, however, can be identified. 
 
The specification of functional forms 
The deterministic function vij will be specified as a Box-Cox transformation of 
disposable household income and leisure, i.e. 
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rk is gross income when the husband/wife is in state k. T(ri,rj) is the tax paid by the 
couple. C0 is a reference disposable income level set equal to the basic pension in the 
years of observations, which is considered to be equal to the subsistence level.  
 L Mi and LFj are leisure for the husband and wife respectively. The discrete 
leisure values are set out in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Leisure across states 














We deduct 8 hours sleep a day and measure leisure relative to total number of hours a 
year.  
  L is common leisure and is defined as  
 
[ ] Fj Mi L L L , min =          ( 1 2 )  
 
  The scale parameters of the v-functions are α,  β1,  β2 and β3.  The shape 
parameters are α1, β11, β22 and β33. If all of these shape parameters are equal to 1, then 
the v-function is linear in disposable income and leisure. If the shape parameters all go 
to zero, then the v-function becomes a log-linear function of disposable income and 
leisure.  
  The scale parameters, except for α, are all assumed to depend on observed 
covariates. Let Ak denote the age of spouse k and let Zk denote the education level of 
spouse k. We will assume that 
  10
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3. Estimates and predictions 
 
To estimate the model we need to assess the income in states not occupied by the 
individuals. Potential retirement benefits follow from earnings histories (which are 
observed) and are predicted using all details of the rules. Moreover, because 
retirement is an absorbing state, we need potential earnings in period t+1 only for 
persons who worked in period t.  
We have the choice of either estimating earnings functions and predict 
earnings, or using the observed values. The observed values reflect how earnings are 
affected by observed and unobserved covariates. We believe that individuals know the 
current stochastic component of their earnings function, while the analyst does not. 
Moreover, there are good reasons to expect the stochastic components to be serially 
correlated. We have therefore decided to use the observed earnings as much as 
possible. This means that we have used the observed earnings of an individual in the 
history window (1992) and/or in the observation window (1993/1994) to predict his or 
her earnings in the states of full time work and part time work. If we have 
observations of income in only one of these states, we predict the income in say part 
time work by dividing the observed income in full time work by 2. For women who 
are observed to be out of the labour force, we have to predict income based on the 
estimated earnings function described in the Appendix, Section 2.    
Gross income when the husband is in the state of delayed retirement is 
assumed to be the income as full time worker for half a year and pension income for 
the other half. 
Because the first twelve months after eligibility do not necessarily coincide 
with a calendar year, we have to employ the tax rules from different calendar years. In 
the Appendix, Section 3, we show the tax structure for wage and pension income for 
one selected year, 1994. In the calculation of disposable income all details of the tax 
structure are accounted for.    11
  We have chosen to divide the sample in two parts according to whether the 
husband works in the private or the public sector. The arguments for doing this are:  
 
-  Because pensions are related to the earnings the very last year of working, 
government employees have incentives to postpone retirement, given that the 
income is not falling. We thus expect the bias for the present to be less in the 
public sector than in the private sector. That is, we expect γ to be higher among 
those working in the public sector than among those working in the private sector. 
-  Persons who have been working in the private sector may have had a more 
strenuous working history and they will thus be more inclined to immediate 
retirement than those working in the public sector. We thus expect the leisure term 
for the male to be of greater importance for the retirement decision if he is 
working in the private sector than if working in the public sector.  
 
The estimates are set out in Table 3. In interpreting the results we should keep in mind 
that the scale parameters of the utility function, uij, cannot be identified. Therefore the 
estimates of the scale parameters do not imply anything about the shape say, the 
concavity of the utility function. However, they give correct information about the 
sign of the marginal utilities, and they can also be used to estimate the marginal rates 
of substitution between consumption and leisure. The estimates can also be used to 
perform policy simulation and to report the impact from these simulations on the 
choice probabilities. 
  In the estimations shown in Table 3 we have assumed that all the shape 
coefficients are the same and this common shape coefficient is denoted α1. Test of this 












Table 3. Estimates 
  Husband in private sector  Husband in public sector 
Variables Coefficients  Estimates t-values  Estimates t-values 
Shape  α1  0.695 15.8  0.752 20.3 
Discounting  γ  0.813 8.2  0.893 10.5 
Consumption  α  3.271 34.0  2.966 34.0 
Male leisure  β1: 
  Constant  b10  0.761 3.7  -1.918  -7.9 
  Education  b11  0.152 2.3  0.300 4.6 
Female leisure  β2: 
   Constant  b20  5.188 16.7  5.146 20.9 




   Constant  b30 1.244  5.8 1.900  9.0 
   (AM-AF) b31  -0.159 -3.0  -0.142 -3.8 
   (AM-AF)
2  b32 0.004  0.9 0.004  2.0 
Observations                       2195                     3334         
Log-likelihood              -4412                 -6364 
 
The shape coefficient is estimated to be nearly the same across the husband’s sector 
affiliation. The estimates are around 0.70, which is slightly above the value found in 
psychophysical experiments, Stevens (1975).  
The point-estimates of the discount factors, the γ-s, imply a bias for the present 
in both sectors, with a stronger bias in the private sector (as expected). The point-
estimates imply a rate of interest of 23 percent if the husband works in the private 
sector and 12 percent if he works in the public sector. However, it should be 
emphasised that γ is not found to be significantly different from 1 in either of the 
sectors. Because γ is found to be significantly different from zero a static model is 
rejected. 
Marginal utility of leisure is estimated to increase with education for the 
husband as well as for the wife
3. If the husband works in the private sector, then 
education is estimated to have a stronger positive impact on the marginal rate of 
                                                           
3 Note that education also has an impact on behaviour through earnings. The higher the education level 
is, the higher is earnings. Thus education will have two opposing effects on labour supply.  13
substitution between disposable income and male leisure compared to if he works in 
the private sector.  
As alluded to above, we find that the marginal rate of substitution between 
disposable income and male leisure is more leisure biased if the husband works in the 
private sector.  
The marginal utility of common leisure is estimated to decrease with the age 
difference between the spouses. It should be noted that for some values of male 
education level and difference in age between spouses, the marginal utility of male 
leisure is negative when the husband works in the public sector. Taken at face value, 
this indicates that for some, but rather few in the sample, there is a bias for being work 
addicts. To prevent them for having an unrealistic high working load there must be 
some rationing of offered jobs with long hours in the market.      
  In Table 4 we report how well the model predict the states chosen by the 
married couples. For each couple the model is used in stochastic simulations to predict 
their choice. Probabilities are calculated as the average over households.  14
Table 4. The average of predicted probabilities across households and observed 
fractions 
State specification 
Husband in private 
sector 
Husband in public 
sector 









11 Full-time  Full-time 0.1317  0.1870  0.2024  0.2706 
12 Full-time  Part-time 0.1786  0.0992  0.2183  0.1413 
15  Full- time  Out of 
labour force 
0.2178 0.2387  0.2396  0.2555 
21 Part-time  Full-time 0.0087  0.0238  0.0156  0.0327 
22 Part-time  Part-time 0.0187  0.0113  0.0333  0.0179 
25 Part-time  Out  of 
labour force 




Full-time 0.0487  0.0755  0.0459 0.0616 
32 Delayed 
retirement 





0.0907 0.0932  0.0618  0.0689 
41 Immediate 
retirement 
Full-time 0.0506  0.0667  0.0192 0.0243 
42 Immediate 
Retirement 





0.1002 0.1125  0.0435  0.0540 
 
We observe that the model tends to overestimate the number of couples that choose 
full time work for both spouses and underestimate the combination of full time work 
for the man and part time work for the female. Apparently, there are some problems 
with modelling the behaviour of the females in these rather old cohorts. However, the 
most important issue in our paper is to model the behaviour of married males who are 
eligible for early retirement. To focus more on how well the model predicts the 
behaviour of males we have calculated the marginal probabilities of the husband’s 
choices in the labour market. In Table 5 we have lumped the states of delayed and  15
immediate retirement into one category called retirement. As is demonstrated in Table 
5 the marginal probabilities of the husband’s choices are rather precisely predicted. 
 
Table 5. Marginal choice probabilities of the husband’s choice 
Husband works in private sector  Husband works in public sector  Marginal states 
Observed Model  Observed Model 
Full time work  0.5281  0.5177  0.6603  0.6674 
Part time work  0.0515  0.0518  0.0786  0.0727 
Retirement  0.4204 0.4235 0.2613 0.2598 
 
We will end this section with addressing the question of the importance of accounting 
for the forward-looking behaviour in explaining the labour market choices of married 
men who are eligible for early retirement. As alluded to above, the justification for 
accounting for the future implications of current choices in explaining current choices 
is that the decision to retire early is an irreversible act. Yet, one could ask whether a 
model with forward-looking behaviour (as modelled above) performs better than a 
model that ignores this aspect, and if so, how much better. Thus, in Table 6 we report 
the estimates of a model without forward-looking behaviour (Model A), which is the 
same model as the one estimated above, with the exception that γ is set equal to zero. 
Model A is a static multi-nominal logit model covering the labour supply choices of 
married couples. To facilitate comparisons we repeat the estimates and predictions 















Table 6. Estimates of models without forward-looking behaviour (Model A) and with 
(Model B) 
 
Husband in private sector  Husband in public sector 
Model A  Model B  Model  A  Model B 
Coeff-
icients 
est.  t-val est  t-val est  t-val est  t-val 
α1  0.791  18.1 0.695  15.8 0.804  21.2 0.752  20.3 
γ  - - 0.813  8.2  - - 0.893  10.5 
α  3.327  28.6 3.271  34.0 2.901  32.1 2.966  34.0 
b10  0.668  2.5 0.761  3.7 -2.885  -8.6  -1.918  -7.9 
b11  -0.137  -1.4 0.152  2.3  -0.357  -0.3 0.300  4.6 
b20  5.535  17.1 5.188  16.7 5.186  20.4 5.146  20.9 
b21  0.408  3.2 0.300  2.5 0.139  1.5 0.103  1.1 
b30 1.382  5.5 1.244  5.8 2.494  9.8 1.900  9.0 
b31  -0.240  -3.4 -0.159  -3.0 -0.348  -5.9 -0.142  -3.8 
b32  0.004  0.8 0.004  0.9 0.009  2.1 0.004  2.0 
Obser-
vations 
2195 2195 3334 3334 
Log-like-
lihood 
-4492 -4412 -6553 -6364 
 
We observe that estimates are fairly equal, with some exceptions. Model A implies a 
higher estimate of the shape coefficient, α1. In Model A the marginal utility of 
disposable household income (as well as the marginal utility of leisure) is estimated to 
decline less with the relevant arguments than in Model B. Moreover, the scale 
coefficients attached to the marginal utility of male leisure are quite different in the 
two models. We also note that the log-likelihood is higher in model B than in Model 
A. In Table 7 we report the predictions of the marginal choice probabilities of the 
males, based on the two models. We observe that while the forward-looking model 
(Model B) is right on target, the static Model A predicts the observed fractions rather 
badly!  
Thus, we conclude that the forward-looking model, Model B, performs much 
better than the static Model A. Therefore, Model B will used to simulate how policy 
changes affect labour supply, and, in particular, the propensity of the male to retire 
early. The results are presented in the next section. 
 
Table 7. Prediction of marginal probabilities for males based on a model without 
forward-looking behaviour (model A) and with (model B) 
 
Husband works in private sector  Husband works in public sector  States 
Observed  Model A  Model B  Observed  Model A  Model B 
Full  time  0.5281 0.4549 0.5177 0.6603 0.5755 0.6674 
Part  time  0.0515 0.0374 0.0518 0.0786 0.0515 0.0727 





4. Policy Simulations 
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the estimated relationship and the corresponding 
impact of potential policy changes, we have performed two simulations with the 
model. In the first simulation, called Policy 1, pensions are taxed like labour earnings. 
In the second simulation, Policy 2, pension is taxed like labour earnings, and in 
addition pre-tax pension is reduced by 10 per cent. The results in terms of how the 
marginal choice probabilities are affected by the policy changes that are set out in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Marginal choice probabilities for husband and wife, percent 
 
  Husband works in private sector  Husband works in public sector 
Husband  Model   Policy 1  Policy 2  Model   Policy 1  Policy 2 
Full-time    52.49  84.05 86.28 66.74 77.87 81.13 
Part-time     5.18    7.02    7.24    7.27    8.66    9.06 
Delayed 
retirement 
 21.35    2.65    1.73    9.25    4.36    2.87 
Immed. 
retirement 
20.98    6.27    4.75  16.74    9.11    6.93 
Sum  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Wife  Model B  Policy 1  Policy 2  Model B  Policy 1  Policy 2 
Full-time  35.28 34.74 34.88 38.93 37.64 37.97 
Part-time  18.61    17.69 17.73 21.02 19.76 19.84 
Out of 
labour force 
46.11 47.57 47.39 40.06 42.59 42.19 
Sum  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
First, we observe that replacing the actual tax rules related to pension income by the 
tax function related to wage income (Policy 1) is predicted to have a rather strong 
impact on male labour supply. The marginal probabilities of choosing full-time work 
among males working in the private sector is predicted to increase by as much as 32 
percentage points. Consequently, the probability of choosing early retirement is 
predicted to very low values. If the males work in the public sector the effect is 
weaker, but still strong. From the Appendix, Section 3, we note that the taxes paid by 
those who retire are very much lower at low incomes than for wage earners. Thus,  18
introducing Policy 1 worsens the alternative of early retirement to a large extent, in 
particular among those with low pensions.  
Given that Policy 1 has been introduced cutting pensions by 10 percent has 
only a modest, but positive impact on male labour supply.  
The impact on the labour supply of the wife is negative, but numerically rather 
weak. This decline in female labour supply is due to increased labour supply among 
their male spouses, and consequently higher income. Because of the negative income 
effect in the estimated labour supply probabilities, female labour supply goes down.  
  In what follows we will examine how the marginal choice probabilities of the 
male are affected by the policy change. Let ϕi.(Pol r) denote the marginal choice 
probability for the male under Policy regime r; r=1,2 and i=1,2,3,4, and let ϕi.(b) 
denote these marginal choice probabilities before the policy change. Furthermore let R 
denote the disposable income of the household in the history window. In Table 9 
below we give the result of regressing  log [ϕi.(Pol r)/ ϕi.(b)] against log R.  
Similar calculations can be done for females. We show the estimates and t-
values of the slope coefficient and for males only. 
 
Table 9. The relationship between log [ϕi.(Pol r)/ ϕi.(b)] and log R 
  Husband works in the private sector  Husband works in the public sector 
Pol 1/b  Pol 2/b  Pol 1/b  Pol 2/ b  Husband 
Estima
te 
t-value Estimate  t.-value  estimate  t-value Estimate  t-value 
Full-time  -0.271  -17.2 -0.282  -16.6 -0.037  -12.3 -0.037  -  9.7 
Part-time  -0.236  -15.8  -0.247 -15.3  -0.021 -  8.2  -0.020 -  6.4 
Delayed 
retirement 
-0.129  -5.8 -0.166  -7.0 0.105  14.2 0.098  12.2 
Immediate
retirement 
-0.288  -11.6 -0.346  -12.9 0.074      8.2  0.054  5.9 
 
The coefficients imply that in the public sector males with the low pre-policy 
household income increase their labour supply more and reduce their inclination to 
retire more than males in households with high income.In the private sector the 
negative coefficients for all transitions is due to the fact that  when running the 
regressions of the log odds ratio of marginal probabilites we do not  account for the  19
fact that transitions probabilities should sum to unity. Numerically, the coefficient for 
Full-time work dominates, and the interpretation also for the private sector is that low-
income households show the strongest response to policy changes in increasing their 
labour supply. 
From the model it follows that the expected consumer surplus for an 
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where y1=y2=Σk=1,2,4Σs=1,2,5 exp(vks(t+1)) and y3=y4=Σs=1,2,5 exp(v4s(t+1)). 
 
Let CS(Pol r) denote the expected consumer surplus under policy regime r, r=1,2 and 
let CS(b) denote the surplus before the policy change. To check how the loss in 
consumer surplus from introducing the change in the budget constraints is distributed 
across households, we have regressed σ[CS(Pol r)-CS(b)] against household income, 
R, for the period prior to estimation. The results of these four regressions are given in 
Table 10. Because the change in taxation of pension income hits the lower income 
groups harder than the higher income groups, we will expect that the loss in expected 
consumer surplus is higher for the lower income households than for the higher 
income households.  
  Note that because there is a loss for all households CS(Pol r)-CS(b) will be 
negative. If households with lower prior income lose more than households with 
higher income, then we would expect that the coefficient in front of log household 
income is positive. 
4 
 
Table 10. The relationship between the change in expected consumer surplus,  
σ[CS(Pol r)-CS(b)], and the log of household income, R, prior to estimation. t-values 
in parentheses 
Husband in private sector  Husband in public sector 
Policy regime  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
                                                           
4 Because we limit the discussion of the regression results to the sign of the slope, we do not need to 
employ cardinal utilites.   20

















These results confirm the conjecture that the poor households will suffer more from 
the consider change in tax rules and pensions than the rich. Thus, the policy 
experiments considered here imply that a higher labour force participation can be 
achieved by changing tax and pension rules but at the expense of a less even 
distribution of household welfare. Therefore one has to make the familiar trade off 
between efficiency and equity. It should be noted that equity here is related to the 
distribution of household income prior to estimation and hence also prior to the policy 
experiments. The r- square coefficients related to the regressions in Table 10 are rather 
low, which indicate that prior household income is only one variable among a possible 
large number of variables that can explain the heterogeneity in the distribution of CS.  
 
5. Conclusion 
When the husband works in the private sector the take-up rate of early retirement 
during the first twelve months after becoming eligible (once during 1993 and 1994) 
was around 40 percent. If the husband works in the public sector the corresponding 
take up rate was around 25 percent. A model with forward-looking and utility 
maximising married couples has been estimated on these data. The estimated model 
has been used in stochastic simulations to predict the outcome of taxing pensions as 
wage earnings and to cut pensions by 10 percent.  
  Taxing pensions as labour earnings induced a substantial decline in immediate 
and delayed retirement and a substantial shift towards full-time work among males. 
Female labour supply is nearly not affected, but females tend to decrease their labour 
supply a little. An additional 10 per cent cut in the pre-tax pension income has a 
positive impact on full-time work among both spouses, but the effect is a magnitude 
smaller than the effect obtained by changing taxation. Husbands in poor households 
tend to increase their labour supply more than husbands in rich households. Poor 
households are also more negatively affected in terms of loss in expected household 
welfare than the rich households.  21
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1. Institutional Setting 
In 1988 employers and unions negotiated an early retirement scheme (AFP). Under 
this scheme, persons working for employers who are participating (today about 43 % 
of private employees and all employees of central and local government) and meeting 
individual requirement could retire at an earlier age than the ordinary 67. From 
January 1 1989, the AFP age was 66. It was lowered to 65 from January 1 1990, to 64 
from October 1 1993, to 63 on from October 1 1997 and to 62 from March 1 1998. 
The pension level was as it would have been from age 67 according to the public 
pension system, had the person continued till that age in the job they held at the time 
of early retirement. 
The backbone of the retirement system in Norway is a mandatory, defined 
benefit public pension system, covering all permanent residents, established in its 
current form in 1967. Because we study the retirement decision given accumulated 
rights, the description below focuses on the regulations determining the benefits. 
Regarding the financing of the system, we will just mention that contributions to the 
system are levied on employers and employees as percentages of total earnings and on 
self-employed as a percentage of their income, as part of the income tax system. 
Although there is a central pension fund, it is not required that this fund should meet 
future net expected obligations, and the system is based on yearly contributions from 
the government. 
  The benefits consist of two main components. One component is a minimum 
pension, paid to all persons who are permanently residing in the country. With less 
than 40 years of residence, the pension is reduced proportionally. This reduction 
mainly applies to immigrants, of which there are very few in the sample, and we will 
not pay any attention to this feature of the system in the following. The other main 
component is an earnings based pension.  
A crucial parameter in the system, used for defining contributions as well as 
benefits, is the basic pension. The basic pension in most of 1994 was NOK 38 080. 
There were small adjustments during the observation period, and these were  24
accounted for when calculating potential pensions on the basis of the basic pension. 
The earnings based pension in the private sector depends on the basic pension and the 
individual earnings history in several ways. Each year, earnings exceeding the basic 
pension is divided by the basic pension to give pension ‘points’ for that year. Earnings 
above 12 times the basic pension do not give points, and earnings between 6 and 12 
times the basic pension (8 and 12 times for earnings before 1992) are reduced to one 
third before calculating points. The yearly points are then multiplied by 0.45 (points 
obtained after 1992 are multiplied by 0.42) and the average yearly points over the 20 
best years are calculated. These points multiplied by the basic pension give the 
earnings based component, and adding the basic pension gives the total public 
pension. If a person has had less than 40 years with earnings above the basic pension, 
the earnings based pension is reduced proportionally.  
  The public pension system also has a number of additional regulations, which 
we will only briefly recount here. Firstly, since we are still in the process of phasing in 
the public pension system, a special 'overcompensation' program is in operation for 
persons born before 1928. Secondly, there is a supplementary pension for those 
without any earnings based pension component, giving a minimum pension level of 
1.605 times the basic pension. This means that income below 2.344 times the 
minimum pension does not influence the public pension. Thirdly, there is co-
ordination of the pensions for married couples, mainly reducing their joint pension 
compared to the sum for two single persons. All of these features have been taken into 
account when we calculated potential pension. 
  Keeping 1994 regulations constant, the maximum future pension level will be 
3.94 times the basic pension (G), NOK 180 080 (as of April 1st, 1 USD is 
approximately NOK 8.30). This pension level requires 20 year with earnings of at 
least NOK 456 960 and another 20 years with earnings of at least NOK 38 080. 
Although there is a re-distributive effect of the tax system also for pre-retirement 
earnings, this effect is much stronger after retirement. For pre-retirement earnings up 
to around NOK 100 000, after-tax pension is actually higher than after-tax earnings. 
Also, the after-tax public pension curve is fairly flat, implying a strong re-distributive 
effect. The replacement level implied by the public pension curve falls from one at an 
income level of 2.344 G (below that level income does not influence the public  25
pension). At earnings just giving the maximum pension, the replacement level is 
between 0.3 and 0.4. 
  State and local government employees have alternative pensions, co-ordinated 
so that benefits will be the maximum of the public and the government pension. The 
government pension is calculated in much the same way as the public pension, but 
with some important distinctions. First, it is based on the earnings level immediately 
prior to retirement and not on the previous earnings history. Secondly, the reduction in 
accrued pension points starts at 8 times the basic pension, allowing the maximum 
employer-based public sector pension to be 6.16 times the basic pension in the public 
system, giving a replacement ratio at that level of 0.51. In addition, there are employer 
based and private, additional pensions (tax deductible and widespread). 
  There are also special tax rules, which apply to retirement benefits. These are 
briefly described below, but all details are given in Haugen (2000). In the early 
retirement program a tax-free lump-sum amount was given to those who retired from 
a job in the private sector. In the government sector a higher, but taxed lump-sum 
amount was awarded.  
 
2. Data Sources 
The basis for the analysis is register files held by Statistics Norway. The files are all 
based on a personal identification number that allows linking of files with different 
kinds of information and covering different periods in time.  
  For the present study, we used register files covering the entire population and 
spanning the period 1992-95. The information of interest in the register files is: 
 
Demographic variables 
•  Date of birth 
•  Gender 
•  Marital status and the identification number of spouse 




From the labour market authorities 
•  Start- and stop-dates for any periods of registered unemployment 
•  As reported by employer: 
•  Start- and stop-dates for spells of employment, with identification 
of employer 
•   Job-type (Full-/Part-time) 
•  Industry 
 
From the tax-files 
•  Wage-earnings 
•  Earnings from other sources 
 
 
From the social security authorities 
•  The complete series of earned public pension points since 1967 
•  Start dates for early retirement with information on whether the individual 
received private or public pension 
•  Received benefits from the early retirement scheme 
 
For more details about data sources, see Røgeberg (1999). 
 
3. Sample, States, and Economic Attributes 
 
General 
The data sets used here cover the whole population over the period 1992-1995, 
and give detailed information on employment, earnings and benefits (pension 
incomes) of various types, gender, age (also birth date), marital status, educational 
attainment, place of residence and local rate of unemployment. There is information 
about the month in which the retirement option becomes available and the month in 
which it is taken out. During the observation period, there was in general not an 
option to combine work and pension. There is also information on the level of  27
earnings and on all the components of the pensions once they are taken out. Direct 
information on the potential pension, covering also those who are eligible but who do 
not immediately take out, are only partly available, although the main components are 
covered. The available information on potential pension is accrued rights in the public 
pension system. This also forms the basis for potential early retirement pensions. Even 
if there is no direct information on accrued rights in the public sector pension system 
(covering only public sector employees, and not to be confused with the public 
pension which covers all residents) we know their latest job and assume this was their 
permanent position. Nor is there direct information on accrued rights in employer-
based pensions in the private sector or private pensions.  
Limiting the analysis to persons eligible for early retirement ensures that the 
option is actually open for the persons in the sample, but does also limit the risk 
group. In addition to being employed by companies that are covered, there are 
individual limits on working hours and work experience. This means that employees 
of companies not covered, typically small companies in the private sector, persons 
with short labour market careers and self-employed are excluded. From a modelling 
point of view, this is a reasonable limitation, since the incentives will be different for 
employees in very small companies and for self-employed, calling for a different 
modelling approach. Still, the early retirement scheme (AFP) covers employees of 
more than half the labour force. A substantial proportion is still in the labour force at 
age 64, in 1990 about 60 per cent of the males and 40 per cent of females (Statistics 
Norway, op. cit.). The analysis therefore covers an important phase in the transition 
from work to retirement. 
The data set is restricted to cover households in which the husband becomes 
eligible for early retirement during 1993 or 1994, and in which the wife does not 
qualify during this period. Because the husband is on the average about three years 
older than the wife, this is the most common situation for married couples. In about 80 
per cent of the selected households the wife is too young to qualify, and in only 4 per 
cent of the households she is 67 and receiving old-age pension. The rest of the wives 
do not qualify for early retirement either because they do not work in an early 
retirement (AFP) company or does not qualify on the basis of personal labour market 
attachment or history.   28
In the present study, we analyse retirement behaviour of married men who 
became eligible for the early retirement scheme (AFP) during 1993 or 1994 and labour 
supply of their wives, who are required not to qualify. Since the scheme is employer-
based, we identify employers where some of the employees took out early retirement 
and identify all other employees in those companies. With this procedure, we may 
miss some companies, but are certain that those companies that are identified are 
participating.  
 
Early Retirement Companies 
The early retirement scheme (AFP) operates on a company level, covering most of the 
private and the whole public sector. In order to identify the companies participating in 
the early retirement scheme, we made a list of individuals who were registered as 
recipients of early retirement benefits in at least one of the years 1993-1995 without 
having been registered as such the previous year. We then found their work-records 
from the previous year, and, including only those individuals with a single work-
record in order to avoid misidentification, made a list of all the companies involved. 
Though a company may be comprised of several firms, and though not all firms in a 
single company necessarily have to introduce the early retirement scheme in concert, 
the conditions where this ”common-policy” assumption does not hold are rather rare 
and the rule holds as an approximation. Whereas the companies thus identified can 
safely be assumed to be included in the AFP, there may be companies not identified, 
simply because no employees took out AFP during the observation period. This is a 
special problem with small companies in the private sector.  
Of the roughly 1.9 million individuals registered with at least one work record 
in the records of the labour market authorities in 1993-94, approximately 56% were 
registered with a work record in one of the companies our procedure identified as 
participating in the AFP-scheme. Because the proportion of the labour force working 
in AFP-participating companies has been increasing, this compares quite well with the 
official estimate of 60%. 
  29
Eligibility, Take-up Date and Cohorts 
In the AFP companies all employees attaining the required age were selected as 
eligible if they  
•  had been employed in the company the last 3 years or been employed in another 
company also operating the AFP scheme the last 5 year, 
•  had earnings at a level at least corresponding to the basic pension (G) when AFP is 
taken up, 
•  had earnings at least equal to the basic pension the year before, 
•  had an average proportion between earnings and the basic pension of at least 1 in 
the 10 best years after the age of 50 and  
•  had at least 10 years in which earnings were at least twice the basic pension. 
 
Persons meeting individual criteria while working in companies covered by the 
scheme became eligible from the month after they turn the required age. With 
information on birth date, we are therefore able to identify exactly the date of 
eligibility.  
The observation period is 1992-1995. In order to observe earnings prior to 
retirement eligibility and whether retirement is taken out, we use the birth cohorts of 
1928-1930 and observe retirement outcome during 1993-95 of persons becoming 
eligible 1993-94.  
This gives a three-year window for observation of early retirement, within 
which persons became eligible (provided they meet the other requirements) from the 
first of the month after the required birthday. On October 1, 1993, the eligibility age 
was lowered from 65 to 64 years. Hence, between January 1 and September 30 1993, 
persons born between these dates in 1928 met the age requirement (65). These are the 
oldest persons in the data set and they became 67 during the same period in 1995, so 
that early retirement behaviour can be observed during a two-year period from the 
time of eligibility until age 67. 
On October 1 1993, a whole new age cohort met the age requirement, 
comprised of the remainder of the 1928 birth cohort (born after September 30) and 
those in the 1929 cohort born up to October 1. Those born in 1928 after October 1 
became 67 during 1995, giving an observation window increasing from 2 years for the  30
oldest to 2 years and 3 months for the youngest. Those born in 1929 before October 1 
became 67 after 1995, so that the observation window is limited by the end of the 
observation period, giving an observation window increasing from 2 years and 3 
months until 2 year and 9 months. 
During the remainder of 1993, the rest of the persons in the 1929 birth cohort 
met the age requirement. For the oldest persons in this age group the observation 
window before ordinary retirement is 2 years and 3 months. The observation window 
then tapers off until 2 years for the youngest in the 1929 cohort. For persons in the 
1930 cohort the observation window is 2 years for the oldest and 1 year for the 
youngest.  
The data sets thus gives us observation windows varying from 2 years and 9 
months, to 1 year, with a truncation at 2 years.  
 
Couples 
A data set of couples was then created, comprising men eligible for early retirement 
during 1993 or 1994 who were married to an identified wife not eligible for early 
retirement during the same period. We started by identifying all males who had at 
least one work-record in one of the early retirement identified companies. We then 
proceeded to remove 
 
•  Those with a spell of unemployment at some time in the period 1992-95 
•  Those non-eligible due to age 
•  Those with a work and earnings history not meeting the AFP requirements  
•  Those who did not work in an early retirement company the year before they 
would otherwise have become eligible for early retirement 
•  Those not ”reciprocally married” to an identified person. Either because they were 
•  Not married 
•  Registered as married, but missing the identification number of a spouse 
•  Registered as married, but the identification number of their spouse was not 
found in the register files (dead, too old or other) 
•  Not ”reciprocally married” (Individual A registered as married to B, but B 
registered as married to C or to no-one at all)  31
 
To this set of men with identified wives we affixed information on wage earnings, 
types of job (full-/part-time, industry, private/public), age, educational level, pension-




The AFP Take-up Profile 
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of waiting times between eligibility and start of 
AFP. On October 1 1993 a whole new cohort became eligible, and we have therefore 
split the sample. Panels A shows the waiting time for those who become eligible 
during the first three quarters of 1993, panel B waiting times for those qualifying in 
the last quarter of 1993, and panel C waiting times for those qualifying during 1994. 
The period of time we can observe an individual varies with his eligibility date, and 
we chose a one-year cut-off point after eligibility in order to have a one-year 
observation period of retirement outcome for all who qualify during 1993 or 1994. 
The total take-up rate for the sample when using a one-year cut-off point is 30.8 per 
cent. After two years (for those observed that long) the take-up rate is 40.6 per cent. 
In panel A we note a rather sharp fall in take-up after the first month. The 
pattern in panel B is much less clear, probably because a rather “untidy” cohort then 
were thrust into eligibility. Due to reduction in the age limit from 65 to 64 taking 
effect 1 October 1993, a whole cohort became eligible on 1 October 1993. It may well 
be that people plan retirement a long time ahead, and will not immediately react when 
becoming eligible one year before they had initially planned. As time goes by, plans 
are adjusted and the effects diminish. There is also a spike after one year (not shown 
in Figure A.1, which only cover the observation period), much more markedly after 
the lowering of the retirement age 1 October 1993 and remaining throughout 1994. 
Part of the reason for this may be that for individuals who are in the public sector and 
who qualify for the more generous public pension type, the public pension does not 
start before age 65. If they take out early retirement from age 64, they therefore 
receive pension of the private type until they turn 65, at which age they begin to 
receive public pension. Thus, retiring at 64 (possible from 1 October 1993) means  32
they will have to endure a sharper dip in ‘income the first year of their retirement’, 
then would be the case if they waited one year. Factors such as liquidity constraints 
and myopia may combine to make this problematic.  
Although the one-year spike is much sharper among public employees after 1 
October 1993, there is a spike also among private employees. This may be because 
our procedure for the classification of companies into private and public is imperfect, 
but it may also be that this is a compound phenomenon.  
The spike also occurs among those qualifying during 1993, at age 65, indicating that 
also a “birthday effect” will be in operation. Some individuals may use special 
occasions such as their birthday or the coming of a new year as an occasion for 
implementing major, planned changes, perhaps as a personal strategy against 
procrastination or as a way of making an already special day take on added 
significance.  
 
Figure A.1. Distribution of Waiting Times Between Eligibility and Start of AFP 
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Retirement Alternatives and Combination with Work 
For two major reasons, we assume that people who are in the period of their working 
life that we are studying here, do not consider major changes in job or hours worked 
other than those related to retirement. First, there are transaction costs, like training, 
attached to a change of job. Secondly, the labour supply literature amply demonstrates 
Panel b:
Distribution of waiting times for those 
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that there are indeed not always jobs with a continuum of working hours available, 
and that people are rationed with respect to offered hours in the market, see Aaberge 
et al (1999). The changes related to retirement occur to a large extent because a 
previously unavailable option has become available, and we assume that other 
changes in job or earnings than these we will not occur. Hence, we assume that 
persons will choose among a set of discrete alternatives. Figures A.2 and A.3 below 
show changes in average income before and after AFP eligibility, for those who take 
AFP and those who do not. As within-year dates for income are unreliable, we have 
chosen calendar year as the time unit. 
 
Figure A.2. Mean couple income by source for 
couples where husband took up early retirement 














































Figure A.3. Mean couple income by source for 
couples where husband did not take up early 













































As expected, average income does not change much if the husband does not retire. If 
he does retire, his pension does not compensate for the fall in earnings, and the 
couples’ total income falls. The wife’s average earnings are largely unaffected. 
 
 
Destination States and Economic Attributes in the Alternatives 
Based on the sharp drop in AFP take-up after the first months, we have chosen to split 
retirement into immediate and delayed retirement. We also include a state for part-
time work. The destination states for those who qualify are set out in Table A.1 below, 
which include also the principles for pre-tax economic characterisation of the states. 
The procedures for calculating after-tax income (‘consumption’) are described in the 

























Classification principles for destination 
state 
  Principles for pre-
tax potential income 
over next 12 months 
 Frequency 
observed in our 
sample 
 Waiting  time 
between 
eligibility 
and start of 
AFP 
  Weekly hours worked 
in the job held in the 
year eligibility occurs 
     
1. Full-time 
work 




  30 or more     Predicted earnings, 








  4-29 (in the job held in 
the year eligibility 
occurs) 





2-12 months    -    6 months earnings 
(see below) 





0-1  months   -   Predicted  pension 
(see below) 
 1170 
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Table A.2 Destination States for Wives of Eligible Males 
Destination 
state 
Classification principles for destination 
state 
  Principles for pre-
tax potential income 
over next 12 months 
 Frequency 
observed in our 
sample 
  Weekly hours worked         
1. Full-time 
work 
30 or more (in the job held in the year 
eligibility occurs 
 Predicted  earnings, 




4-29 (in the job held in the year eligibility 
occurs) 
 Predicted  earnings, 
see below 
 2659 
5. Out of 
labour force 
   Benefits   4070 
  
 
Full-time Work and Part-time Work  
There are two alternatives for predicting potential earnings in the two states part-time 
and full-time work  
 
1.  Use observed earnings last calendar year, and increase or reduce proportionally 
to obtain potential full-time earnings for part-timers and vice versa 
2.  Predict on the basis of an earnings function estimated on observed earnings 
last year.  
 
In the first alternative we assume that if people continue to work at the same level 
without taking out any pension, they earn as much as they did last year, and if they 
move to part-time from full-time or the other way round, they face proportional 
increases/reductions.  
In the second alternative, we remove transitory fluctuations and measurement 
errors in earnings, but also permanent individual variation apart from what is captured 
by covariates like education, gender, industry, weekly hours group. If permanent 
individual variation is more important than measurement errors and transitory 
fluctuations, alternative 1 is best. In this version, alternative 1 was chosen, with the 
exception of estimating the potential earnings of females who were observed to be out 
of the labour force.   39
  Gross annual labour income, r, if working full-time or part-time is predicted 
from the estimated annual income function given below: 
 
τ + λ = X r ln  
 
where τ is a normal distributed error term. The covariates entering the X-vector are: 
 
1)  Working full time=1, Working part-time=0, 
2) Age, 
3)  Education, with 15 years of education or more as a reference category, otherwise 
three categories: less than 8 years of education, less than 10 years of education, 
less than 15 years of education, 
4)  Working in private sector=1, =0 otherwise, 
5)  Number of years before the observation period with less than full-time work. 
 
Immediate Retirement 
Potential pension following eligibility is calculated according to rules applied to an 
earnings history. Details are given in Haugen (2000), see also Hernæs et al. (2000).  
The pension level is calculated in several steps. We start by calculating 
potential public pension on the basis of accumulated rights, which are registered. 
Although this is only a part of the total pension rights it is strongly correlated with full 
pension. Also, since we assume that people may receive private or public pension 
according to the sector they work in the year they become eligible, we implicitly 
assume that those working in the public sector  have done so for a period of time long 
enough for them to qualify for public pensions.  
 
Delayed Retirement 
Based on the observed take-up profile, we predict 6 more months of work and 6 




Out of Labour Force 
Wife's income when she is out the labour force is either zero or equal to the capital 
income and/or government transfer allocated to her. 
 
Tax rules 
On average pension incomes are taxed at somewhat lower rates than labour income. 
The tax structure is progressive, but marginal tax rates are not uniformly increasing 
with income. Thus, the tax rules imply non-convex budget sets. In the estimation of 
the model all details of the tax structure are accounted for. A detailed description of 
the tax rules is given in Haugen (2000). As an illustration we show the tax rules for 
1994. 
 
Table A.3. Tax rules, 1994. All amounts in NOK 1000  
 
Pensions Earnings 
Income Tax  Income Tax 
0-120 0  0-42  0 
120-140 0.44Y-53  42-140  0.302Y-13 
140-199 0.55Y-68  140-252 0.358Y-21 
199-252 0.31Y-21     
252-263 0.405Y-44  252-263 0.453Y-45 
263- 0.447Y-55  263- 0.495Y-56 
 
We observe that the marginal tax rates on pensions are note uniformly increasing with 
income, which indicates that the budget is non-convex. 
 